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INTRODUCTION
During the early months of 2012, the Supreme Court handed
down two relatively obscure immigration law opinions: Holder v.
Martinez Gutierrez1 and Kawashima v. Holder.2  While the highly publi-
cized immigration decision in Arizona v. United States 3 largely over-
shadowed these decisions in the mainstream media, the two cases are
highly illustrative of a dangerous trend in the field of immigration law.
The Court ruled against two lawful permanent residents (green card
holders) in Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez regarding their petitions for
cancellation of removal.4  Similarly in Kawashima v. Holder, the Court
ruled against Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima, longtime permanent residents
of the United States, and upheld their status of removability for filing
a false tax return.5  While at first glance these two cases appear to be
relatively innocuous decisions, Martinez Gutierrez and Kawashima are
actually the latest reminders of the near total lack of judicial review or
oversight available in immigration law.  Immigration law has a long
history of judicial deference and lack of any meaningful judicial re-
view. 6  In recent decades, the ruling in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., which significantly broadened the defer-
ence given to administrative agencies7 and the Attorney General’s
broad discretion, have only exacerbated this problem.8
Judicial deference is particularly dangerous in a field such as im-
migration law, which holds great human consequences and affects
some of the most disenfranchised and distant members of our legal
system.9 Martinez Gutierrez and Kawashima are merely the latest exam-
ples of the severe injustice that judicial deference to administrative
agencies and a lack of any meaningful use of the immigration rule of
lenity may cause in the immigration context.  This Note reviews
1 Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012).
2 Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012).
3 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
4 Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2021.
5 Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1176.
6 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process . . . .”); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (holding Congress has plenary power to
remove people from the United States); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 585 (1889) (describing the power of the sovereign to regulate
immigration and the limited nature of review in this setting).
7 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that when Congress’s intent is not clear,
courts defer to a reasonable agency interpretation).
8 See William C.B. Underwood, Note, Unreviewable Discretionary Justice: The New Extreme
Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. L.J. 885, 904–07 (1997) (discussing the
broad discretion of administrative decision makers in cancellation-of-removal cases).
9 See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration Decisionmak-
ing, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861, 861–62 (1994) (arguing that deference eliminates the judi-
cial check on arbitrary decision making).
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Martinez Gutierrez and Kawashima to examine broader issues facing our
immigration system today.  I demonstrate the tension between the
Attorney General (via the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)) and
the federal courts of appeals, and the consequences of judicial defer-
ence to administrative agency decisions in the immigration context.
Part I of this Note introduces the background of the issue, includ-
ing the statutory background behind immigration reform, removal
from the country, and the cancellation-of-removal procedure, as well
as the Chevron standard of deference to administrative decisions.  Part
II analyzes Martinez Gutierrez, Kawashima, and relatedly, the persistent
conflict between the circuit courts and the BIA.  Part III highlights the
particular reasons why deference is so dangerous within the immigra-
tion context, recommends a policy of greater judicial oversight, and
advances the theory that the purported goals and ideals of our immi-
gration system are no longer in line with the functional application
of these laws.  Ultimately, my Note concludes that traditional
Chevron-style deference is not appropriate in cases such as Martinez
Gutierrez or Kawashima and recommends a standard that more fully
addresses the particular needs of noncitizens, particularly long-time





Until 1940, the Immigration Act of 1924 required deportation of
a noncitizen illegally in the United States and made no exceptions
under any circumstances.10  The earliest example of a statutory provi-
sion providing for a cancellation or waiver of deportation came in the
Alien Registration Act of 1940.11  This Act allowed for suspension of
deportation by the Attorney General if the noncitizen met certain re-
quirements.12  The Alien Registration Act of 1940 began a pattern of
expanding avenues of relief from deportation for those noncitizens
who would experience hardship that continued until 1990.13  More
recent legislation, however, has significantly curtailed these forms of
discretionary relief for deportable noncitizens, while simultaneously
10 See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 14, 43 Stat. 153, 162 (1924).
11 See Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, § 20, 54 Stat. 670, 672–73
(1940).
12 See id.
13 See Brian N. Hayes, Matter of A-A-: The Board of Immigration Appeals’ Statutory Misinter-
pretation Denies Discretionary Relief to Aggravated Felons, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 247, 274
(1993) (noting that “the Alien Registration Act of 1940 did not immediately exact punish-
ments upon aliens”) (citation omitted).
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increasing the number of noncitizens who qualify as deportable.14
Taken together, the expanding number of noncitizens who qualify for
deportation and the shrinking avenues of discretionary relief for these
noncitizens is a disturbing trend in our immigration system.
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA),15 which remained largely unchanged until 1990.  Before the
sweeping changes made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), section 212(c) and
section 244(a) of the INA were the primary forms of relief from de-
portation.16  Section 212(c) (waiver of inadmissibility or deportability)
was a broad provision that provided lawful permanent residents po-
tential relief from deportation.17  Recognizing the extreme hardship
that deportation had on long time permanent residents, section
212(c) allowed lawful permanent residents (LPRs) a discretionary
waiver of most grounds of exclusion.18  To qualify, a returning lawful
permanent resident had to have been lawfully admitted as a perma-
nent resident and must continue to hold that status, must have had a
domicile of seven consecutive years in the United States, must have
departed the United States voluntarily, and may not be deportable for
a number of specified criminal categories.19  This provision was even-
tually interpreted to provide broad protection for both lawful perma-
nent residents returning from trips abroad as well as noncitizens
currently residing within the United States.20  Section 244(a) (suspen-
sion of deportation) was a similar provision that applied to nonci-
tizens who had not previously been granted lawful permanent
resident status.21  Section 244(a), which a noncitizen could only raise
in deportation proceedings, allowed the Attorney General to suspend
deportation for certain noncitizens who had resided in the United
States for a significant period of time and could demonstrate that seri-
ous hardship would result from their deportation.22
14 See 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 74.01[1] (rev.
ed. 2013) [hereinafter GORDON].
15 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537).
16 INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996); INA § 244(c), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(c) (1994) (repealed 1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). For background, see GORDON, supra
note 14, § 64.04[1]. R
17 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 74.04[1][a]. R
18 See id.
19 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 74.04[2][a]. R
20 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 74.04[1][a]. R
21 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 74.07[3][a]–[c]. R
22 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 74.07[2][a]. R
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2. 1996 Changes and the IIRIRA
Congress enacted the IIRIRA in 1996 largely to restrict illegal im-
migration and attack criminal aliens by expanding the categories of
crimes that make a noncitizen eligible for deportation.23  The IIRIRA
introduced sweeping changes to most aspects of immigration law.  Sig-
nificantly, the IIRIRA erased the earlier distinction between “exclu-
sion” (refusal to admit someone at the border) and “deportation”
(removal of someone already within the United States), consolidating
both procedures under the new title of “removal.”24  Similarly, a new
provision for “cancellation of removal” replaced sections 212(c) and
244(a).25  This new provision can be found in section 240A of the
INA.26  While ostensibly created as a device to allow noncitizens to
remain in this country, cancellation of removal carries much higher
barriers to eligibility than its predecessors.27  The current provision
enacted by the IIRIRA provides three criteria for cancellation of
removal.28
One of the critical restrictions placed on this discretionary relief
by the IIRIRA relates to the expansion of the definition of aggravated
felonies.29  A conviction for an aggravated felony is one of the primary
impediments to receiving relief from deportation through cancella-
tion of removal.30  While a comprehensive look at the full topic of
criminal grounds for deportability is outside the scope of this Note, it
is important to mention that the IIRIRA expanded the definition of
aggravated felonies to a much broader range of crimes to include over
fifty different types, ranging from theft to murder and including tight-
ened restrictions on drug and fraud offenses, adding to the list of
crimes.31  This expansion has placed significant limits on the availabil-
ity of cancellation of removal, one of the few available grounds for
relief from removal from the United States.32
23 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 627–28 (1996); see also Underwood, supra
note 8, at 892–95 (explaining that Congress further “placed additional procedural restric- R
tions limiting an alien’s ability to reopen and reconsider deportation proceedings”).
24 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 64.01[1]. R
25 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 74.04[1][b] (IIRIRA “repealed INA § 212(c) in its R
entirety and replaced it with an analogous form of relief called cancellation of removal.”).
26 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012).
27 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 64.04[1] (“[R]emoval is always a heavy burden . . . .”). R
28 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
29 GORDON, supra note 14, § 74.04[1][b]. R
30 See id.
31 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 71.05[2]. R
32 See id. See generally Underwood, supra note 8. R
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B. The Chevron Standard
1. The Chevron Case
In addition to the statutory provisions for cancellation of re-
moval, one of the most significant issues in Holder v. Martinez
Gutierrez 33 was regarding the deference standard expressed by the Su-
preme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.34  Almost thirty years after the Supreme Court decided Chevron,
the case has transformed the landscape of administrative law and cre-
ated a myriad of scholarship.35  It has become one of the most famous
cases in administrative law.  Two commentators have even called it
“the most cited case in modern public law.”36  To understand Martinez
Gutierrez, it is imperative to understand Chevron.
Chevron involved a dispute over who should interpret Congress’s
1970 Clean Air Act Amendments—the circuit courts or the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 37  The Supreme Court ar-
ticulated a two-part test for determining when courts should defer to
the interpretations of administrative agencies.38  In step one, a review-
ing court should ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”39  If a reviewing
court finds congressional intent ambiguous, the court must continue
on to step two.  In step two, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.”40  The Court made clear in Chevron that “a court may not substi-
tute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”41
33 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012).
34 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
35 See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1283–91 (2008)
(revisiting the theories Chevron rests upon); Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test:
Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2011) (arguing Chevron should not
apply when the agency interpretations are based on informal procedures); Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 838–51 (2001) (examin-
ing the scope of Chevron’s mandatory deference).
36 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?  An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006).
37 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845–46
(1984).
38 See id. at 842–43.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 843.
41 Id. at 844.  In Chevron, the Court used the words “permissible” and “reasonable”
interchangeably to describe an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute. See id. at
843–44.  The Court has continued to use these two terms interchangeably in their cases
discussing the Chevron standard. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868
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Chevron essentially expanded the use of administrative and agency
interpretations from circumstances where Congress specifically
granted this interpretation power to any instance where Congress left
an ambiguous intent.42  Many argue that Chevron has numerous bene-
fits, including promotion of uniformity and efficiency, as well as pres-
ervation of separation of powers.43  Decades later, however, academics
are still debating Chevron’s foundation.  In regard to the principles
supporting Chevron, scholars still debate “whether Chevron deference
rests upon a theory of congressional delegation, administrative exper-
tise, agency deliberative rationality, the executive branch’s political re-
sponsiveness and accountability, concerns for national regulatory
uniformity, or inherent executive power.”44
2. Chevron’s Legacy in Immigration Cases
Of the thousands of cases that have followed from the monumen-
tal Chevron decision, two important cases bear mentioning when dis-
cussing Chevron in the immigration law context.  First, in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court overturned the BIA’s statutory in-
terpretation of the rules for asylum and withholding of deportation.45
Section 243(h) of the INA covered withholding of deportation and
required that it be “more likely than not that the alien would be sub-
ject to persecution.”46  Section 208(a), which covers asylum, allows a
discretionary grant of asylum if a refugee has “a well-founded fear” of
persecution.47  While the BIA interpreted the “well-founded fear” lan-
guage to mean the fear had to be “more likely than not” and claimed
that the two standards were the same, the Supreme Court examined
the vastly different language of the two sections and concluded that
Congress had intended for different standards to apply.48
(2013) (“Statutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable interpreta-
tion, not by the courts but by the administering agency.”); id. at 1880 (“We give binding
deference to permissible agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities . . . .”).  Conse-
quently, these two terms will be utilized interchangeably throughout this Note.
42 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 35, at 833. R
43 See generally David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper
Place: A Tool of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 479, 494–501 (2007) (explaining
Chevron’s benefits).
44 Criddle, supra note 35, at 1273. R
45 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
46 Id. at 423 (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  In 1996 as part of the IIRIRA, Congress changed INA section 243(h) to
section 241(b)(3), changing “[w]ithholding of deportation” to “[r]estriction on removal.”
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012).  But the “more likely
than not” standard remains the same.
47 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 425, 430; see INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1952),
amended by Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (applying the definition
of “refugee” to the “well-founded fear” standard).
48 Cardoza-Fonseca at 446–49; see INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (applying to with-
holding cases and interpreted to have a “clear probability” standard, which Cardoza-Fonseca
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Cardoza-Fonseca importantly demonstrates two key propositions re-
lated to applying Chevron in the immigration context.  First, while im-
migration law typically has been subject to minimal judicial review or
oversight, Cardoza-Fonseca stands for the proposition that some judicial
review is proper in immigration cases, despite the plenary power and
Chevron. Chevron is not a license merely to rubber stamp administra-
tive action. 49  Second, Cardoza-Fonseca aptly illustrates an appropriate
use of step one of the two-step Chevron analysis.50 Chevron only re-
quires a two-step analysis if the intent of Congress is ambiguous.
When congressional intent is clear and the statute is unambiguous, an
agency (or a court) may not create its own rule or interpretation.
Next, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre 51 stands for a contradictory proposi-
tion; it reminds us that while Chevron allows judicial review, circuit
courts must also comply with Chevron step two by paying due defer-
ence to reasonable agency decisions when congressional intent is un-
clear.  In this case, the BIA held a Guatemalan native ineligible for
withholding of deportation based on its interpretation of “a serious
nonpolitical crime.”52  After the Ninth Circuit reversed, the Supreme
Court reversed again, reinstating the original BIA decision.  Having
found the language ambiguous, the Court followed Chevron step two
and ordered the circuit court to defer to the reasonable interpretation
of the BIA.53  In doing so, the Court made clear that Chevron does
apply in immigration cases to limit judicial review.  Here, the Supreme
Court agreed that the statute was ambiguous and therefore continued
the Chevron analysis to step two, ruling on the reasonableness of the
agency’s interpretation.
Taken together, Cardoza-Fonseca and Aguirre-Aguirre illustrate that
immigration law is not insulated from Chevron.  This does not mean,
understood as “more likely than not”); INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (applying to asy-
lum cases and establishing a “well-founded fear” standard, which Cardoza-Fonseca held was
not governed by the section 243(h) standard).
49 The Court in Cardoza-Fonseca gave some explanation of the role of federal courts in
reviewing the statutory construction of agencies such as the INS. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. at 445 (“The INS argues that the BIA’s [statutory] construction . . . is entitled to
substantial deference, even if we conclude that the Court of Appeals’ reading of the stat-
utes is more in keeping with Congress’[s] intent.  This argument is unpersuasive.”  (cita-
tion omitted)); id. at 446 n.30 (“An additional reason for rejecting the INS’s request for
heightened deference . . . is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through
the years.”); id. at 448 (“[O]ur task today . . . is well within the province of the Judiciary. . . .
[W]e merely hold that the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that
the two standards are identical.”).
50 To see how the Court analyzed Chevron and, given statutory ambiguity, proceeded
to review the BIA’s decision, see id. at 445 n.29, 446–48.
51 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
52 Id. at 418 (citing the statutory language previously found in INA § 243(h)(2),
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(c), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 § 307, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
53 Id. at 423–25.
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however, that circuit courts lack teeth to exact judicial review in ap-
propriate cases under Chevron’s system of review.
C. The Immigration Rule of Lenity
Lastly, before proceeding to Martinez Gutierrez and Kawashima, it
is critical to look at an important, competing issue in the immigration
context.  Constantly in the background, butting heads with Chevron’s
presumption of deference, is the immigration rule of lenity.  The rule
of lenity was originally a common law doctrine in the criminal law
context that required courts to construe ambiguous laws in favor of
the defendant due to the overwhelming constitutional concerns asso-
ciated with punishment and depriving an individual of life, liberty, or
property.54  The immigration rule of lenity follows the same princi-
ple.55  As early as 1948, the Supreme Court acknowledged deporta-
tion’s harsh consequences when it stated that deportation is a “drastic
measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.”56  Due
to these strong concerns, the Supreme Court announced the canon
that ambiguities affecting deportation should be read in favor of the
noncitizen. 57  In doing so, the Court mirrored the centuries-old doc-
trine of criminal lenity, which requires narrow statutory construction
in favor of a defendant.58
These related rules of lenity are well-established guidelines of
statutory construction that the Court has used for decades when deal-
ing with ambiguity.59  The Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Cardoza-
Fonseca 60 and INS v. St. Cyr.61  Despite the frequency with which the
Court cites this rule in immigration cases, it is no more than a judi-
cially created rule of construction.  Courts have often abandoned this
judicially constructed common law or failed to square it with the more
recent Chevron standard when Chevron, an official Supreme Court doc-
trine of deference, appears to conflict with the rule of lenity in immi-
gration cases.62  On the one hand, courts should have to defer to
interpretations advanced by the immigration agencies.  In recent de-
cades, however, doing so often directly conflicts with the principle of
54 See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 520 & nn.17–21 (2003) (examining the history of the rule of lenity in the
criminal context and then the eventual use of the rule in the immigration context).
55 See id.
56 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that deportation may deprive an individual “of all that makes
life worth living”).
57 See Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10.
58 See Slocum, supra note 54, at 516–20. R
59 See id. at 519–22.
60 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
61 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001).
62 See Rubenstein, supra note 43, at 501–04. R
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lenity—that ambiguous statutes be construed favorably for the nonci-
tizen in deportation cases to ameliorate the harmful effects deporta-
tion.63  This unresolved conflict was precisely the issue in Martinez
Gutierrez.  The difficulty in analyzing this issue lies in the dearth of
cases addressing both the principle of lenity and Chevron together.
Courts instead seem to cite one or the other, and the Supreme Court
often defers to Chevron (as in Martinez Gutierrez) or dismisses lenity (as
in Kawashima) summarily, perhaps assuming it is  established stare
decisis that Chevron holds greater weight than lenity.  Despite most
courts’ unwillingness to square the two concepts, I believe comparing
the Court’s two recent decisions in Martinez Gutierrez and Kawashima
can be helpful and illustrative in finding a reasonable way to apply
both standards to immigration and removal cases.
II
ANALYSIS
A. Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez
1. Factual Background
In the first of two consolidated cases, Carlos Martinez Gutierrez’s
family brought him to the United States illegally as a five-year-old
minor.64  Two years later, his father was legally admitted to the coun-
try and became a lawful permanent resident.65  Martinez Gutierrez
lived in the United States continuously after 1989 but did not get his
own green card and legal status until 2003.66  After an arrest in 2005,
he sought cancellation of removal based on his long residency in the
United States and his father’s fourteen years of lawful permanent
resident status.  Martinez Gutierrez could not himself fulfill either of
the requirements for cancellation of removal—he had neither five
years of permanent resident status nor seven years of residency.67
Given that he was a minor when he was brought to the United States,
however, he asked that the immigration judge impute his parent’s
time while he was a minor to satisfy the requirements for cancellation
of removal.68
Similarly, in the second case, Damien Sawyers was lawfully
admitted on a green card in October 1995 when he was still a
63 Cf. id. at 504–08, 511–17 (arguing that “lenity should be applied only . . . after the
court determines both that [a] statute is ambiguous under [Chevron’s] step one and that
the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable under step two”).
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fifteen-year-old minor.69  His mother had been legally residing in the
United States for six years before this date.70  Sawyers was convicted of
a drug offense in August 2002 and sought cancellation of removal.71
While Martinez Gutierrez did not satisfy the requirement of either
seven years of legal residence or five years of lawful permanent resi-
dent status, Sawyers was a much closer case for satisfying the statutory
requirements for cancellation of removal.  Sawyers had already met
the five years of lawful permanent resident status and was only two
months shy of having seven years of continuous legal residence.72  He
asked that the immigration judge impute his mother’s additional six
years of legal residence to him to satisfy the cancellation-of-removal
requirements.  In both cases the immigration judges denied relief.73
2. Procedural Background
In both cases, the BIA, the administrative board that hears immi-
gration appeals, determined that Martinez Gutierrez and Sawyers
could not satisfy the requirements for cancellation of removal them-
selves.  In both cases, the BIA refused to allow imputation.74  On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit overruled the BIA in both cases, relying on a
number of earlier Ninth Circuit cases to rule that the BIA’s interpreta-
tion was unreasonable and indicating that a parent’s residency time
should be imputed to minor children.75  The Supreme Court consoli-
dated the two cases and granted certiorari.
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Martinez Gutierrez
The current cancellation-of-removal provision reads:
(a) Cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents
The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if
the alien—
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence for not less than 5 years,
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7
years after having been admitted in any status, and
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.76




73 Id. at 2016–17.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2016; Gutierrez v. Holder, No. 08-70436, 411 F. App’x 121, 122 (9th Cir.
2011) (mem.), rev’d sub nom Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012); Sawyers
v. Holder, No. 08-70181, 399 F. App’x 313, 314 (9th Cir. 2010) (mem.), rev’d sub nom
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012).
76 INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012).
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The BIA has consistently interpreted this language to require each
noncitizen seeking cancellation of removal to meet these three crite-
ria individually.77  The BIA argued this was clearly a permissible inter-
pretation of the statute, as it does not mention imputation
anywhere.78  The Supreme Court, citing Chevron, deferred to the BIA
and stated that the BIA’s interpretation “prevails if it is a reasonable
construction of the statute, whether or not it is the only possible
interpretation.”79
In response to these contentions, respondents Martinez Gutierrez
and Sawyers advanced a number of historical and statutory construc-
tion arguments.80  The respondents drew numerous parallels between
the current INA section 240A and its earlier iteration in INA section
212(c) in an attempt to overcome the presumption of ambiguity of
congressional intent in the statute.81  The previous statute allowed
cancellation of deportation upon a finding of “lawful unrelinquished
domicile of seven consecutive years.”82  Respondents argued that be-
cause a child’s domicile is the same as his or her parents and because
this often led the BIA to impute a parent’s domicile to his or her child
under the previous statute, Congress had intended imputation to ap-
ply in these cases despite the legislative change.83
The Court rejected the respondents’ arguments regarding sec-
tion 212(c).  On the contrary, since Congress removed the key word
“domicile” when enacting section 240(a), the Court found that the
argument actually cut against respondents and failed to show any such
congressional ratification of the idea of imputation.84  The Court was
similarly skeptical about respondents’ argument that the stated pur-
poses of the immigration system—family unity and relief for nonci-
tizens with strong U.S. ties—required imputation here.85  The Court
acknowledged that these are important goals but held that they are
not the only goals of the immigration system and that it cannot be
assumed Congress would pursue goals such as family ties above all
else.86  In rejecting the decisions of the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court demonstrated the enormous level of judicial deference com-
mon in immigration law and illustrated the anemic power of current
77 Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2017.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 2017–20.
81 See id. at 2018–20.
82 INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, § 304(b), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996).
83 See Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2018.
84 See id. at 2018–19.
85 See id. at 2019.
86 See id.
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judicial review to correct potential injustices in the immigration
system.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez Gutierrez
does not appear novel.  Rather, the Court cited Chevron as if it were a
completely decided principle and applied stare decisis rather summa-
rily.87  It is exactly this summary treatment, however, that makes this
case a perfect example to highlight a number of issues in the immigra-
tion law context that require further inquiry and more robust judicial
scrutiny.
B. Conflict Between the Circuit Courts and the BIA
The two Ninth Circuit cases here illustrate a common conflict be-
tween the circuit courts of appeals and the BIA.  The Supreme Court
noted in Martinez Gutierrez that under the older INA section 212(c),
“the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits (the only appellate courts to
consider the question) concluded that, in determining eligibility for
relief under [section] 212(c), the Board should impute a parent’s
years of domicile to his or her child.”88  Additionally, in both Sawyers
v. Holder and Gutierrez v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit found the BIA’s
reading of the statutory provision to be impermissible and instead
held that imputation of a parent’s time in the United States was the
accepted standard even under the new INA section 240A.89  This cre-
ates an interesting tension where the BIA is required to follow an over-
ruling decision by a circuit court within that particular circuit but can
and often will continue to follow its own interpretation in the rest of
the circuits.90  This nonacquiescence is permissible because the BIA is
a part of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Executive Office of Im-
migration Review (EOIR), and as an independent agency, the BIA is
free to follow its own rulings except in jurisdictions where a federal
appeals court has overruled them.91  This may lead to different
87 See id. at 2021 (“[T]he decision reads like a multitude of agency interpreta-
tions . . . to which we and other courts have routinely deferred.  We see no reason not to do
so here.”).
88 Id. at 2018 (citations omitted).
89 See Gutierrez v. Holder, No. 08-70436, 411 F. App’x 121, 122 (9th Cir. 2011)
(mem.), rev’d sub nom Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012); Sawyers v.
Holder, No. 08-70181, 399 F. App’x 313, 314 (9th Cir. 2010) (mem.), rev’d sub nom Holder
v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012).
90 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 784, 786–87, 789 (B.I.A. 2012) (applying a
different (required) standard in removal proceedings arising within the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits than the general BIA standard applied elsewhere); Salazar-Regino, 23 I.
& N. Dec. 223, 235 (B.I.A.  2002) (recognizing the Ninth Circuit’s contrary ruling but
failing to apply it outside the Ninth Circuit and instead holding that outside the Ninth
Circuit, a first-time drug possession offense that was expunged is still a conviction for immi-
gration purposes).
91 See, e.g., Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223 at 234–35 (finding that a court of
appeals decision in a different circuit is not binding); Singh, 25 I. & N. Dec. 670, 672–73,
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standards applying in different states and regions of the country,
which can create confusion and undermine clarity in the administra-
tion of immigration law.
C. Kawashima v. Holder
1. Factual Background
Akio and Fusako Kawashima became lawful permanent residents
in June 1984.92  Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima, natives of Japan, had been
lawfully living in the United States for thirteen years when, in 1997,
Mr. Kawashima pled guilty and was convicted of preparing a false cor-
porate tax return.93  Mrs. Kawashima was convicted of helping him
prepare this return.94  After the Kawashimas served their criminal
sentences, the INS brought a claim charging that they were deport-
able as noncitizens who had been convicted of an aggravated felony.95
Despite the couple’s long and peaceful time spent living in the United
States as permanent residents, the INS brought deportation proceed-
ings against them under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), which states
that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time
after admission is deportable.”96
2. Procedural Background
As mentioned above, the Immigration and Nationality Act lists
over fifty categories of crimes as “aggravated felonies” for immigration
and deportation purposes.97  Here, the INS asserted that the
Kawashimas qualified as aggravated felons based on 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M), which lists as an aggravated felony any crime that
either:
(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims
exceeds $10,000; or
(ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion)
in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.98
679 (B.I.A. 2012) (holding that a court of appeals decision that reversed a BIA precedent
decision is not binding in a case in a different circuit).  See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
(2013) (defining the BIA’s jurisdiction and powers); Holper, supra note 35, at 1244–46 R
(illustrating the relationships between the BIA, as an executive branch agency, and other
courts in handling removal proceedings); Rubenstein, supra note 43, at 480 & n.4 (explain- R
ing that the Attorney General has authority to issue controlling rulings in connection with
the INA and has delegated interpretational authority to the BIA).
92 Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1170 (2012).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1170–71.
96 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012); Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1171.
97 See Gordon, supra note 14, § 71.05[2][b]. R
98 8. U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (2012); Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1171.
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During the Kawashimas’ deportation hearing before an immigration
judge (IJ), they asserted that their crimes should not qualify as aggra-
vated felonies under these provisions.99  The IJ ruled against the
Kawashimas and found that they were removable from the United
States as noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony under
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).100  The Kawashimas appealed the decision to
the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s decision.101  The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the BIA’s decision on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to rule on whether their crimes qualified as aggravated felo-
nies under the immigration laws.102
3. The Majority’s Decision in Kawashima v. Holder
The Kawashimas advanced a number of arguments for why their
convictions did not qualify as aggravated felonies under the immigra-
tion statutes and particularly under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  First, they
argued their crimes did not involve “fraud or deceit” as required by
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).103  Next, they claimed that tax crimes are cov-
ered in § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) and should not be included in clause (i)
of subparagraph M at all.104  Lastly, the Kawashimas claimed that sub-
paragraph (M)(i) was at the very least ambiguous and therefore,
under the immigration rule of lenity, should be construed in their
favor due to the harsh nature of removal.105  Justice Clarence
Thomas’s majority opinion addressed and rejected each one of these
arguments in turn.106
First, Mr. Kawashima was convicted as a person who “[w]illfully
makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other docu-
ment . . . which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every
material matter,”107 and he argued that this crime does not contain
“fraud” or “deceit” as a formal element.108  The Court, utilizing a cate-
gorical approach to the interpretation of the crime, determined that
the words “fraud” and “deceit” did not need to appear formally in the
definition, as subparagraph (M)(i) included crimes where fraud was
“involved,” and that knowingly submitting an untrue tax return inher-
ently involved deceit.109




103 Id. at 1171.
104 Id. at 1173.
105 See id. at 1175–76.
106 See id. at 1172.
107 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2012); Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1172 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
108 Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1172.
109 See id.
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Next, the Court addressed the far more compelling argument re-
garding statutory interpretation and the fact that in light of subpara-
graph (M)(ii)’s specific mention of tax-related crimes, subparagraph
(M)(i) should not include such crimes.110  The Kawashimas asserted
that, when read together, it was clear Congress intended subpara-
graph (M)(i) to cover general non-tax crimes where the loss was to
personal victims, while (M)(ii) covered the separate category of tax
crimes causing a loss to the government.111  In support of this reading
the Kawashimas mentioned the difference in language between
(M)(i)’s “loss to the victim” and (M)(ii)’s “revenue loss to the Govern-
ment,” as well as the familiar presumption of statutory interpretation
that one is to interpret statutes to avoid superfluities.112  The
Kawashimas contended that if (M)(i) covered all tax crimes as the BIA
and Ninth Circuit had supposed, it would render (M)(ii) superfluous
and redundant.113  The Court rejected these arguments, claiming that
the difference in scope of each provision explained the difference of
language, and that rather than a superfluity, Congress intentionally
added subparagraph (M)(ii) “to remove any doubt that tax evasion
qualifies as an aggravated felony.”114
Finally, the Court’s treatment of the Kawashimas’ final argument,
an appeal to the immigration rule of lenity, is most striking and im-
portant.  The Court summarily dismissed the use of the immigration
rule of lenity with little justification.  The principle of lenity is treated
in the following two sentences of the opinion: “It is true that we have,
in the past, construed ambiguities in deportation statutes in the
alien’s favor.  We think the application of the present statute clear
enough that resort to the rule of lenity is not warranted.”115
4. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent in Kawashima v. Holder
To truly illustrate the summary treatment of the Kawashimas’
case and how this decision highlights the disturbing trend of less judi-
cial scrutiny and less lenity in immigration cases involving deporta-
tion, we must look briefly at Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent, in
which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined, arguing for
lenity given the ambiguities in the statutory interpretation.  Justice
Ginsburg addressed two key issues with the majority’s reading of the
statute.  First, she reiterated that the reading made clause (M)(ii) su-
perfluous in all but the most rare circumstances. 116  Additionally, she
110 See id. at 1173–75.
111 See id. at 1173.
112 Id. at 1173–74.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1174.
115 Id. at 1176 (citation omitted).
116 See id. at 1178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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raised the issue that such a reading pulls an enormous body of tax
crimes, including some minor state misdemeanor tax crimes, into the
federal category of “aggravated felonies” that can make a permanent
resident removable from the United States. 117
First, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent concisely laid out the real issues at
play in this case.  She mentioned that if the Kawashimas’ proposed
reading of the statutory language was “plausible in roughly equal
measure” to the Court’s, “then [Supreme Court] precedent directs us
to construe the statute in the Kawashimas’ favor.”118  She continued
on to cite the line of case precedent that establishes the “familiar ca-
non” that statutory interpretation should avoid superfluities.119  She
then cited case precedent that states that “a conviction for tax eva-
sion . . . ‘conclusively establishes fraud.’”120  From these premises,
Justice Ginsburg concluded that if, as the majority suggested, (M)(i)
had been intended to cover tax offenses, those offenses would neces-
sarily involve fraud and there would have been no need to include
(M)(ii) “to remove any doubt.”121  Thus, the Court’s reading made
(M)(ii) superfluous, and Justice Ginsburg claimed it was not enough
for the court to hypothesize as to an instance when (M)(i) may not
capture a case of tax evasion.  She mentioned that “[t]he Government
conceded that, to its knowledge, there have been no actual instances
of indictments for tax evasion unaccompanied by . . . fraud or de-
ceit.”122  She continued, claiming the canon against superfluity is not
rigid and literal and that the Court had previously declined to inter-
pret legislation to make a provision superfluous “in all but the most
unusual circumstances.”123
Finally, the dissent further undermined the credibility of the ma-
jority’s reading of the statute by illustrating just how many tax offenses
it would sweep up into the aggravated felony category, including mis-
demeanors such as providing a false W-2 form to an employee or com-
mitting various state misdemeanor charges.124  While not discussed
explicitly by the dissent, presuming such a vast congressional intent in
writing the statute seems inherently unlikely, not merely because it
would create aggravated felonies out of misdemeanor charges but also
because of the extremely harsh consequences for permanent residents
who are removed based on an aggravated felony charge.  Among all of
117 Id. at 1179–80.
118 Id. at 1177.
119 See id.
120 Id. at 1178 (quoting Gray v. Comm’r, 708 F.2d 243, 246 (6th Cir. 1983)).
121 See id. at 1174 (majority opinion); id. at 1179–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 1179.
123 Id. (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 29 (2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
124 Id. at 1179–80.
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the reasons for removal in immigration law, criminal grounds of re-
moval, particularly aggravated felonies, are some of the most onerous
for immigrants to overcome.  An aggravated felon is permanently
barred from admission back into the United States125 and, signifi-
cantly, an aggravated felony charge makes a noncitizen ineligible for
cancellation of removal, one of the only discretionary paths to have
their removal overturned.126
III
RECOMMENDATION FOR GREATER JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
A. The Harshness of Deportation and the Case for Special
Deference in Immigration Cases
The conflict between the Supreme Court and the circuit courts of
appeals illustrated in Martinez Gutierrez appears to show a divide in
their fundamental understanding of how courts should apply Chevron
deference.  This may indicate differing interpretations of how to rec-
oncile the two competing rules of construction: Chevron deference
and the immigration rule of lenity.  It is therefore important to look at
the reasoning behind the circuit courts of appeals’ decisions and how
their interpretation of Chevron might differ from the Supreme Court
in order to determine the special considerations within immigration
law that might warrant more rigorous judicial review.
Many cases and law review articles have highlighted the harsh na-
ture of deportation.  The Supreme Court has called deportation “a
drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or
exile.”127  Removal, by forcing persons to leave their home and possi-
bly their family, directly affects their lives, liberty, and property.  The
Supreme Court has noted that deportation may result in the loss of
“all that makes life worth living.”128  While not technically a criminal
penalty, the Court has noted that deportation is “intimately related to
the criminal process.”129  In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court pointed out
that due to recent immigration changes such as the enactment of the
IIRIRA, removal and criminal sanctions have become even more en-
twined as these “law[s] have made removal nearly an automatic result
for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.”130
125 See INA § 212(a)(9)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(i) (2012) (establishing inadmissibil-
ity based on prior removal for certain offenses).
126 See id. § 240A(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012) (eligibility for cancellation of removal
based on no prior convictions of any aggravated felony).
127 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
128 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
129 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
130 Id.
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B. The Implications of Martinez Gutierrez and Kawashima
Unfortunately for Martinez Gutierrez, Sawyers, and the
Kawashimas, they all fell into this “broad class of noncitizen offenders”
for whom removal was the only possible outcome after receiving their
criminal convictions.131  In Martinez Gutierrez, both respondents, who
had been residing in the United States since adolescence, were
brought here as minor children, had close ties to the United States,
and were ultimately ordered to be removed when the Supreme Court
upheld the immigration judge’s original order.132  This decision to
favor a “permissible” construction of a statute seems particularly harsh
for someone like Sawyers, who had been living with his family in the
United States since 1995 and was convicted of a drug offense just two
months shy of the seven years of residence he needed to be eligible
for discretionary cancellation of removal.133  Similarly, the case of the
Kawashimas seems particularly harsh.  For the Kawashimas’ single
criminal charge of filing a false tax return during decades of legally
residing in the United States as lawful permanent residents, and after
they pled guilty and served their criminal sentences, the Supreme
Court still found Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima removable as aggravated
felons.134  Furthermore, despite having accrued the necessary time pe-
riods of lawful residence in the United States (unlike Martinez
Gutierrez and Sawyers), Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima were prohibited
from applying for cancellation of removal, one of their only discre-
tionary remedies, due to their aggravated felony convictions.135  In ad-
dition to the hardships of these directly affected individuals,
deportation of one noncitizen often creates great hardship for family
members, particularly children, residing in the United States.136
The truly perverse nature of these rulings becomes evident when
we begin to examine these two recent cases alongside each other.  In
both cases, the removal proceedings were not of illegal entrants to the
United States or longtime criminals but of long-term permanent re-
sidents who had legally resided in the United States for anywhere be-
tween two and twenty years.137  In both cases, the crimes committed
131 See id.
132 See Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2012).
133 Id. at 2017.
134 See Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1171 (2012).
135 See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012).
136 See generally David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165 (2006) (discussing the distinct intersection between immigra-
tion and family law and the various ways that the two may conflict and cause serious hard-
ships for immigrant families).
137 See Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2017 (involving consolidated case of one nonci-
tizen who had two-year residency and another who had six-year residency); Kawashima, 132
S. Ct. at 1170 (involving a couple that had lived in the United States for approximately
twenty years before pleading guilty to making false statements on their tax returns).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN405.txt unknown Seq: 20  6-MAY-14 11:37
944 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:925
were singular instances and relatively minor and nonviolent in na-
ture.138  In both cases, the meaning of the statute used to remove
these noncitizens was in question and open to multiple statutory inter-
pretations.139  The result of both cases was to restrict cancellation of
removal: in Martinez Gutierrez by directly restricting who may apply for
cancellation of removal and in Kawashima by defining a large new
group of noncitizen, “aggravated felons,” and making these nonci-
tizens ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal.  Taken together,
Martinez Gutierrez and Kawashima put vast swathes of new lawful perma-
nent residents at risk of being removed without any possible avenue of
relief.  After these recent decisions, any noncitizens who have commit-
ted a removable offense, even one that is not an aggravated felony,
cannot apply for cancellation of removal unless they can individually
meet the two onerous residency time requirements.140  Additionally,
many noncitizens with misdemeanor tax charges are now potentially
removable as aggravated felons141 without any chance to apply for can-
cellation of removal, regardless of the length of time they have been
residing in this country or the burden deportation may place on
them.
Many of these arguments are the same issues that created the cat-
alyst for some form of relief from deportation and removal in 1940.
Under the pre-1940 rigid statute that did not allow for any hardship
waivers, deportation affected so many productive members of society
with strong family and community ties to the United States that
Congress eventually had to act.142  Since the passage of the IIRIRA in
1996, however, the Supreme Court, Congress, and the BIA all seem to
have largely ignored these issues.
The extreme hardships and difficulties that result from removal
are the reason why judicial oversight and review are necessary in the
immigration context.  These hardships are not, however, the end of
the argument.  Rather, these hardships inform the key reasons why
the Supreme Court needs to reevaluate the balance struck between
Chevron and the rule of lenity.  The true reason why immigration
law requires a varied application of Chevron deference lies in the
inherent nature of the immigration system, removal, and the
138 See Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at  2017 (involving a drug offense); Kawashima, 132
S. Ct. at 1170 (involving a conviction for “aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false
tax return”).
139 See Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2017 (stating that the BIA’s interpretation of the
statute would “prevail[ ] if it is a reasonable construction of the statute, whether or not it is
the only possible interpretation or even the one a court might think best”); Kawashima, 132
S. Ct. at 1174 (indicating that the Court was “interpreting Clause (i) to include tax
crimes”).
140 See Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2015.
141 See Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142 See GORDON, supra note 14, § 74.01[1]. R
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cancellation-of-removal doctrine.  I believe courts have failed to ana-
lyze meaningfully these two doctrines together because they view
them as competing alternative theories.  Instead, I propose a new the-
ory and suggest that in the future, courts should not think of lenity
and Chevron as competing doctrines but rather assume that lenity is an
established principle that courts use during both Chevron step one and
step two analyses.  Essentially, the immigration rule of lenity is a doc-
trine to be used within Chevron’s framework.
C. Recommendation for Reconciling Chevron and the
Immigration Rule of Lenity
As discussed above, the lack of meaningful judicial review in the
context of cancellation of removal is particularly troubling because it
is one of the only provisions allowing a deportable noncitizen
to remain in the United States.143  By its very nature, the
cancellation-of-removal provision presumes that the noncitizen is re-
movable.144  Additionally, because a noncitizen seeking cancellation-
of-removal is already removable, these individuals are in a particularly
precarious position.  The noncitizen in cancellation-of-removal pro-
ceedings concedes removability and relies only on the courts’ good
faith, discretion, and compassion to be spared the hardship of leaving
this country.  Furthermore, it is important to remember that cancella-
tion of removal is at the discretion of the Attorney General.145  There-
fore, by its very nature, the statute enacted by Congress contains a
purpose of leniency and forgiveness.146  The combination of the pur-
ported goals of the immigration system, the nature of cancellation of
removal as a discretionary procedure to avoid hardship, and the long-
established judicial principle of lenity in deportation-related immigra-
tion cases, creates a presumption that Congress intended these proce-
dures to favor the noncitizen over the government, and that despite
Chevron, lenity clearly has some place in the analysis.  It seems unlikely
that Congress would create a limited avenue of relief from removal,
make it discretionary in its application for those noncitizens who do
qualify, and then intend for ambiguous statutes regarding who is eligi-
ble for review to be construed in a severely limiting way.
143 See Underwood, supra note 8, at 888 (“For the estimated five million illegal immi- R
grants[,] . . . cancellation of deportation is one of the few avenues available to become a
lawful permanent resident.”).
144 INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012) (“The Attorney General may cancel re-
moval in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United
States . . . .”).
145 See id.
146 See Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2019 (2012) (stating that the
purpose of cancellation of removal includes “providing relief to aliens with strong ties to
the United States” and “promoting family unity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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This presumption of congressional intent to favor the noncitizen
in situations involving removal becomes even more striking when one
considers a recent line of Chevron cases, most notably United States v.
Mead.147 Mead and similar cases have emphasized that the Chevron
standard of deference rests on congressional intent.148  As others have
noted, Chevron did not argue, and it has not been claimed, that this
level of deference is constitutionally required.149  Rather, Mead made
clear that Chevron deference applies because of the presumption of
congressional intent that Congress has delegated its authority to make
rules and carry out laws to the various administrative agencies.150  If,
however, Chevron deference rests on congressional intent, then a
strong countervailing congressional intent may significantly under-
mine traditional Chevron deference.  Given that the recent Mead line
of cases generally considers Chevron to rest upon congressional intent,
the myriad of evidence of an intent toward lenity, from both the tradi-
tional common law rule of lenity and from the nature of the
cancellation-of-removal provision, can be used to readjust the Chevron
analysis at both step one and step two.
First, in Chevron step one, a court must determine if Congress has
expressed an unambiguous intent on a given issue.  This raises the
question, however, of how a court knows when Congress is expressing
its intent clearly.  Often, the plain language of the text may convey an
unambiguous intent but will not in many other cases.  This is exactly
why courts have common methods of statutory interpretation, and
Chevron confirms that a court should determine if Congress expressed
its clear intent by “employing traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion.”151  The scope of a Chevron step-one analysis can therefore
change depending on which tools of statutory construction the court
chooses to use and how the court applies them.
First and most simply, then, courts must recognize that the immi-
gration rule of lenity is a traditional tool of statutory construction, sim-
ilar to the common practice of looking to legislative history to
determine legislative intent.152  While the immigration rule of lenity is
treated as such in other contexts, there is no reason it cannot function
as such a tool of statutory construction within Chevron’s framework as
147 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
148 See, e.g., id. at 226–27 (holding that Chevron deference applies when it appears
Congress delegated to the agency authority to make rules carrying the force of law).
149 See Slocum, supra note 54, at 535–39 (identifying arguments and cases that show R
that most commentators, and even the Supreme Court, do not believe Chevron deference is
constitutionally required).
150 Id. at 538.
151 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
152 Slocum, supra note 54, at 541. R
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well.  However, always applying the immigration rule of lenity as a
court’s first tool of statutory construction would not square with
Chevron deference.  Rather, this construction would always favor lenity
whenever a court delved beyond the plain language.  It is for precisely
this reason that scholarship on the immigration rule of lenity suggests
that lenity should only be used on “statutes found ambiguous after
other traditional tools of construction have failed to identify statutory
meaning.”153  Courts, therefore, are directed to look at other tools of
construction before resorting to the rule of lenity.  Even used as a last
resort, however, lenity can remain meaningful by providing a backstop
for the Chevron step-one analysis.  In cases where a court looks beyond
the plain language of the statute and examines tools of statutory con-
struction to determine if Congress expressed an unambiguous intent,
if other common tools of construction fail to illuminate fully the in-
tent, the rule of lenity can sometimes step in to tip the scales in favor
of the noncitizen as it was meant to do.
Importantly, because the rule of lenity would only be acting as a
last resort in Chevron step one, this would not gut the Chevron doctrine
or render it moot.  In many cases, courts may still find that either the
plain language or the plain language coupled with tools of statutory
construction, such as examining statutory history, might express an
unambiguous intent that does not favor the noncitizen.  In other
cases, the intent may be so unclear that neither the plain language
nor any of the tools of statutory construction shed much light on
Congress’s intent at all.  In these cases, where other tools of statutory
construction fail to help disclose Congress’s intent, the rule of lenity
should not be applied, as this would default to favoring the noncitizen
and eliminate Chevron step two.  In those cases of such glaring
ambiguity, courts should still rule that there was no clear intent and
proceed to Chevron step two.  The rule of lenity would then function
in the space between these two extremes, where a statute’s language
and history seem to favor the noncitizen but perhaps not as strongly as
a court would like in order to rule that the intent was unambiguous.
There, the statute’s language, history, and the underlying rule of len-
ity can come together to find an unambiguous intent to favor the
noncitizen.
The case of Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez154 is an excellent example
of how this would work.  In Martinez Gutierrez, Congress had imple-
mented the original predecessor to cancellation of removal to over-
come mounting hardship associated with unfair and rigid deportation
153 Id.
154 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012).
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proceedings.155  Furthermore, under the previous statute and its inter-
pretations, a parent’s time as a resident was imputed to his or her
children to satisfy the requirements to be eligible for discretionary
cancellation of removal.156  While the statute’s language alone may
not express an unambiguous intent to allow such imputation, the stat-
ute’s language, the statutory history, and the underlying rule of lenity
together make the case that the intention of Congress was not ambig-
uous and that Congress had expressed an intent to favor imputation.
While this may not be a specific textual intent regarding imputation, it
appears the statutory purpose creates a presumption of an intent to
favor leniency for the noncitizen.  By taking a deeper look at statutory
construction beyond just the plain language, courts can exact more
searching judicial review while remaining within the mandate of
Chevron step one to determine if there was a “clear intent” to the
statute.
In cases where a court was not inclined to find the rule of lenity
probative under Chevron step one by either choosing to rely solely on
the text without rules of statutory construction or simply finding the
language too unclear even after applying principles of construction,
the Chevron step two analysis still provides another avenue for the rule
of lenity to alter Chevron deference.  While courts often explain the
Chevron test as if there is no further judicial review after step one,
there is an additional measure of judicial review within Chevron step
two.  Step two requires that “the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.”157  Although this requirement has often been treated in a
rubber-stamp fashion, it ought not be.
Again, rather than viewing lenity as a competing theory or canon
of construction, courts should properly view lenity as an underlying
principle of review that informs and contributes to their Chevron analy-
sis.  Thus, under Chevron step two, one of the many factors a court
would consider to determine whether an agency interpretation is
“reasonable” would be how the interpretation fits (or conflicts) with
the principle of lenity for removal cases.  Courts “must reject adminis-
trative constructions of the statute . . . that are inconsistent with the
statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to
implement.”158  While the BIA may argue their interpretation is rea-
sonable given the exact language of the statute, the “statutory man-
date” is not synonymous with the “plain language” of the statute and
155 See id. at 2018–19 (stating that Congress intended cancellation of removal’s prede-
cessor to further the policies of “providing relief to aliens with strong ties to the United
States” and “promoting family unity”  (internal quotation marks omitted)).
156 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. R
157 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
158 FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981).
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encompasses something more, including the intent of Congress.  In
Martinez Gutierrez, when the BIA construed the statute against
its prior statutory history, the inherent purpose of a discretionary
cancellation-of-removal statute, and the broader immigration rule of
lenity, it seems plausible a court could have found that the BIA had
violated the “statutory mandate” and therefore failed to meet the stan-
dard of a permissible interpretation of the immigration laws.
These recent interpretations by the BIA have significantly limited
the number of noncitizens qualified to apply for cancellation of re-
moval.  Rather than allowing cancellation of removal to function as a
discretionary form of relief that gives removable noncitizens the op-
portunity for the Attorney General to review their specific case, the
BIA’s limiting constructions of these statutes closes the door from the
start and bars noncitizens en masse from the opportunity to have their
specific case reviewed individually.  The entire reason for the availabil-
ity of cancellation of removal is to relieve the hardships of removal in
specific cases where removal seems like an excessive penalty.  The stat-
ute’s only purpose is to take individuals who, while technically remova-
ble, have strong ties to the United States, and give them a statutory
break.159  Therefore, reading the cancellation-of-removal statute to
take a hardline interpretation that increases the difficulty of its applica-
tion does not seem to be a permissible reading that is in line with the
statutory purpose.  Furthermore, when considering the decisions in
Kawashima and Martinez Gutierrez in tandem—the former vastly broad-
ening the number of noncitizens who will be adjudged to be deport-
able as aggravated felons and the latter significantly restricting those
deportable noncitizens eligible to apply for relief from removal—it
certainly seems that there was an “unreasonable” reading of the
statute, which was created solely for the purpose of providing discre-
tionary relief.  This determination of reasonableness is exactly how
Chevron step two should function, and the immigration rule of lenity
merely alters the reasonableness argument within this context.
Again, this use of the rule of lenity would not usurp the Chevron
deference standard but merely use lenity within the framework of the
Chevron analysis to alter the analysis slightly in the immigration and
removal contexts.  In many cases, the BIA may interpret a statute in a
way that is not the most favorable to the noncitizen but may still fulfill
the reasonable or permissible standard if it does not appear to contra-
vene the entire purpose of the statute.  Similarly, strong counter-
vailing considerations such as administrative efficiency or practicality
of implementation may tip the scale so that some less favorable inter-
159 See Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2019 (stating that one of the statute’s objective is
“providing relief to aliens with strong ties to the United States”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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pretations are still clearly reasonable.  In this way, the use of the rule
of lenity and the underlying purpose or goal of a statute will not auto-
matically overrule Chevron step two in each unfavorable case but will
simply realign the reasonableness threshold under Chevron step two in
immigration cases.
Unfortunately, while some circuit courts of appeals have been
willing to overrule the BIA, they have not clearly articulated these
principles of lenity and statutory intent to assist noncitizens in removal
proceedings.  Without meaningful arguments advanced by the lower
courts or the parties involved, the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to
alter Chevron and its summary treatment of the traditional rule of len-
ity often stymies the attempts of the circuit courts to interpret prop-
erly the Chevron rule in cancellation-of-removal cases.  In reviewing
cancellation-of-removal cases, courts should look at the countervailing
concerns to judicial deference mentioned above and recognize that
the entire system of cancellation of removal is built upon a concern
for lenity and alleviation of the hardships of removal.  In doing so, the
courts would be able to better define how the immigration rule of
lenity and the Chevron doctrine interact as well as properly apply Chev-
ron deference when strong congressional intent and statutory pre-
sumptions call for a countervailing concern to balance the Chevron
rule.  In cancellation-of-removal cases, the immigration rule of lenity
must be understood as an underlying principle that informs and trans-
forms the traditional Chevron step-one and step-two analyses.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez and
Kawashima v. Holder are illustrative tools of a dangerous trend in re-
cent immigration enforcement that has gone largely unnoticed and
unchallenged.  While much focus was given to Arizona v. United States,
which was essentially just a preemption case, little attention has been
given to the Supreme Court’s other recent immigration decisions,
which have greater implications for the way federal agencies and the
federal courts of appeals handle removal and cancellation-of-removal
decisions in our nation’s immigration system.  In Martinez Gutierrez,
the Court dismissed countervailing considerations rather too quickly,
preferring to defer to traditional Chevron-style deference.  In
Kawashima v. Holder, the Court did not expressly mention Chevron, but
they refuse to utilize the immigration rule of lenity with little justifica-
tion and ultimately uphold the more restrictive (and arguably less
plausible) of two competing statutory interpretations.  I believe the
plights of Sawyers, Martinez Gutierrez, and the Kawashimas aptly
demonstrate the very real human concerns that necessitate greater ju-
dicial review in the immigration context and an altered version of
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Chevron deference. Chevron is not a constitutional mandate or an
impassable barrier to meaningful judicial review.  The Court illus-
trated in Cardoza-Fonseca that there is room for judicial review within
the administrative area of immigration law.  Courts, however, have
been hesitant to square Chevron with the immigration rule of lenity.
Given the enormous stakes in cases of removal, courts should consider
the question more carefully in the future and attempt to articulate the
principles of statutory construction, congressional intent, and lenity
that should define the outer boundaries of Chevron within the realm
of immigration law and removal proceedings.
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